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Abstract 
Bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) predicts that people cooperate to maintain a positive 
reputation with ingroup, but not outgroup, members—and this explains ingroup favoritism in 
cooperation. We propose that the benefits of maintaining a positive reputation are not limited 
by group boundaries and so people may cooperate to maintain a good reputation among 
outgroup members when they will meet and interact with members of that group again. 
According to this unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective, reputation can promote 
cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. Alternatively, social identity theory 
(SIT) favors social identity versus reputation as an explanation for cooperation among 
ingroup members. We test these hypotheses across five studies (Ns = 619, 607, 613, 360, and 
615) that manipulate reputation, social identification, and partner’s group membership in a 
cooperative decision making task. Across our studies, people were more cooperative with 
both ingroup and outgroup members when their reputation was at stake (Studies 1–5), and 
reputational concern mediated the effect of cues of gossip on cooperation in interactions with 
ingroup and outgroup members (Studies 1–4). Social identification did not affect cooperation 
with ingroup members. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the indirect 
benefits of cooperation that can transcend group boundaries.  
Keywords: cooperation, reputation, indirect reciprocity, ingroup favoritism, social 
identity 
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Unbounded Indirect Reciprocity: 
Is Reputation-Based Cooperation Bounded by Group Membership? 
People often enact costly behaviors that benefit others (i.e., cooperate), even when 
these behaviors don’t obviously benefit themselves. Nonetheless, some possible benefits of 
cooperation can be far removed from the actual behavior. For example, an evolutionary 
perspective suggests that humans can condition cooperation on cues that costly cooperation 
may result in either direct or indirect benefits (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). Indeed, people 
tend to cooperate with others they will interact with again, and so situations that contain 
potential direct benefits (Delton et al., 2011). Importantly, people can also cooperate in 
situations that lead to indirect benefits—when current cooperation is observed and gossiped 
about to future interaction partners (Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016). Such indirect benefits 
can be immense and highly rewarding, since gossip and reputation can spread far and wide 
and reach the ears of many potential future interaction partners.    
Bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) hypothesizes that the indirect benefits from 
cooperative behavior (and so a positive reputation) come from ingroup, but not outgroup, 
members (Yamagishi et al., 1999). From this perspective, people cooperate more with 
ingroup members, because cooperation enhances their reputational standing in the group, and 
a good reputation will later translate into benefits received from ingroup members. According 
to BGR, the indirect benefits of reputation are group-bounded, so people behave to enhance 
their reputation only when interacting with ingroup members. We suggest that the indirect 
benefits of a good reputation can extend beyond group boundaries and so people respond to 
cues that their behavior carries reputational consequences with ingroup and outgroup 
members. Here, we advance an unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective and extend 
previous research on reputation-based cooperation by (a) testing whether the cooperation-
enhancing effects of reputation are group bounded, and (b) comparing reputation-based 
accounts of ingroup favoritism in cooperation with a social identity approach.  
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Bounded or Unbounded Generalized Reciprocity? 
Bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) proposes that humans have evolved a 
tendency to cooperate with ingroup members, because cooperation results in indirect benefits 
and reduces the potential cost of being excluded from the group.1 When interacting with 
ingroup members, people may be more likely to meet, interact with, and receive indirect 
benefits from other ingroup, compared to outgroup, members (Yamagishi et al., 1999). Thus, 
BGR states that (a) people have expectations of indirect reciprocity from ingroup members, 
(b) people cooperate with ingroup members to maintain a positive reputation in their group, 
and (c) group membership cues activate a heuristic to cooperate with ingroup members 
(Yamagishi et al., 1999). According to BGR, reputational concern is a core psychological 
mechanism of ingroup favoritism in cooperation (Mifune, Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2010).  
One implication of BGR is that reputational concern only matters during interactions 
with ingroup members rather than outgroup members. To test this hypothesis, Yamagishi and 
Mifune (2008) manipulated common and unilateral knowledge of group membership (i.e., 
whether an ingroup or outgroup interaction partner knows one’s group membership) in 
cooperative interactions. Behavior can only influence reputation when group membership is 
common knowledge. Indeed, people were more cooperative with ingroup than with outgroup 
members in the common (versus unilateral) knowledge condition—a finding replicated across 
several studies (Guala, Mittone, & Ploner, 2013; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). These findings 
suggest that ingroup favoritism is a strategy to enhance reputation within a group.  
BGR assumes that reputation is bounded in groups. Yet, previous common knowledge 
studies do not confirm that reputation is bounded in groups or that people only care about 
their reputation among ingroup members. First, these studies often involve one-shot 
interactions with no future interdependence (Everett et al., 2015). Second, these studies did 
not test reputational concern as a psychological mechanism explaining why people cooperate 
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more with ingroup than with outgroup members. Third, the common versus unilateral 
knowledge manipulation also made salient social identity concerns (cf. Mifune et al., 2010). 
We propose that the psychology underlying concern for reputation and the acquisition of 
indirect benefits may not be limited by group boundaries (Milinski et al., 2001; Wu, Balliet, 
& Van Lange, 2015, 2016). 
According to an unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective, people may condition 
their behavior on multiple cues that identify when behavior can lead to indirect benefits 
(Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). Cues of indirect benefits include whether future interaction 
partners know about one’s previous behavior via observation or gossip, which would 
subsequently affect reputation (Wu et al., 2015, 2016). So, people may even cooperate with 
outgroup members to promote a positive reputation, if intergroup interactions involve cues of 
indirect benefits. Indeed, people cooperate to enhance their reputation when interacting with 
others who could gossip to their future partners (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Feinberg, 
Willer, & Schultz, 2014; Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012; Sommerfeld et al., 2007). 
Moreover, cues of indirect benefits tend to enhance a concern about the collective beliefs that 
others have about oneself, and this reputational concern enhances cooperation (Wu et al., 
2015, 2016). Importantly, previous research did not investigate whether cues of indirect 
benefits (e.g., gossip) are independent of knowledge about partner group membership, and so 
did not inform if people only cooperate to maintain a good reputation with ingroup members. 
To summarize, we have outlined two competing perspectives on reputation-based 
cooperation. BGR hypothesizes that reputation-based cooperation is group bounded—cues of 
indirect benefits only promote cooperation with ingroup members (Hypothesis 1a). 
Moreover, BGR predicts that people will only care about their reputation when interacting 
with ingroup members, and so reputational concern mediates the relation between cues of 
indirect benefits and cooperation when interacting with ingroup, but not outgroup, members 
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(Hypothesis 1b). Alternatively, an unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective predicts that 
cues of indirect benefits (e.g., gossip and public monitoring) will promote cooperation 
independent of partner group membership (Hypothesis 2a). Additionally, this approach 
predicts that people care about their reputation when interacting with both ingroup and 
outgroup members, and that reputational concern will mediate the relation between cues of 
indirect benefits and cooperation (Hypothesis 2b). 
Social Identity versus Reputational Approaches to Ingroup Favoritism 
The perspectives mentioned above are in stark contrast with social identity theory—a 
dominant theoretical perspective that emphasizes the role of social identification and self-
esteem as explanations for ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Brown, & 
Tajfel, 1979). Seminal experiments used minimal group paradigms to divide individuals into 
groups according to a trivial category, and then asked them to allocate valuable resources to 
anonymous ingroup and/or outgroup members (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). 
These experiments showed that the mere categorization into different groups was sufficient to 
promote ingroup favoritism (Billing & Tajfel, 1973; Turner et al., 1979; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Notably, individuals’ choices in these situations were 
not driven by self-interest, previous interactions, or shared values, but by social identity—
ingroup favoritism serves to increase a positive self-esteem (Billing & Tajfel, 1973). A 
crucial process for ingroup favoritism is social identification—how important a group is in 
defining the self (Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001). Previous studies support the hypothesis that 
higher social identification can promote ingroup favoritism in cooperation (Hypothesis 3; 
Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999). 
Nonetheless, several criticisms have been raised about SIT as an explanation of 
ingroup favoritism. First, the minimal group paradigms (MGP; Tajfel et al., 1971) also 
presented some degree of interdependence with ingroup, but not with outgroup, members 
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(Yamagishi & Mifune, 2016). In fact, although participants in the MGP had to allocate 
money to ingroup and outgroup members, behaviors that favored ingroup members could 
actually enhance one’s chance to be reciprocated in future interactions. Indeed, studies 
demonstrate that ingroup favoritism disappears when ingroup members cannot reciprocate 
(e.g., Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989). Second, studies using common knowledge 
manipulations demonstrated that individuals cooperate with ingroup members only when 
their reputation is at stake (Balliet et al., 2014; Yamagishi et al., 1999). Despite these 
critiques, SIT still remains one of the most influential theories to explain ingroup favoritism. 
The few studies that compare SIT and BGR focus on social identification and expected 
reciprocation, but not on reputational concern (Stroebe et al., 2005; Velez, 2015). Here we 
compare how social identification and reputation promote ingroup favoritism. 
Overview of Studies 
We conducted five studies to (a) examine whether the cooperation-enhancing effects 
of reputation are group bounded, and (b) compare reputation-based accounts with a social 
identity perspective on ingroup favoritism in cooperation. Studies 1 and 2 manipulated 
partner’s group membership (ingroup versus outgroup versus unclassified stranger) and social 
identification (high versus low) in a cooperative decision making task. In these studies, we 
also manipulated cues of indirect benefits by making their decisions public or anonymous 
among others (ingroup members, outgroup members, or unclassified strangers) whom they 
would interact with again. BGR predicts that reputation will interact with group membership 
to predict cooperation, such that people will only cooperate to manage their reputation when 
interacting with ingroup members (H1a). An unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective, 
however, predicts greater cooperation in the public, compared to anonymous, situation (main 
effect), without an interaction with partner’s group membership (H2a). SIT predicts that 
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social identification will interact with group membership, such that people will display 
stronger ingroup favoritism when they have high, compared to low, social identification (H3). 
Studies 3 to 5 generalize results by using a different manipulation of cues of 
reputation: gossip to future interaction partners. We also generalize our findings from 
experimentally created “minimal” groups to interactions between natural groups (i.e., two 
political coalitions in the U.S., Republicans and Democrats). Across these three studies, we 
employ a between-participants manipulation of partner group membership in the cooperative 
decision making task, which allows us to measure reputational concern when interacting with 
ingroup or outgroup members. BGR predicts an interaction between gossip and future 
partner’s group membership in predicting cooperation—people are more cooperative with 
others who can gossip to their ingroup members, but not outgroup members (H1a). 
Conversely, an unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective would predict that gossip 
promotes cooperation regardless of their future partner’s group membership (main effect), but 
no interaction with future partner’s group membership (H2a). The gossip manipulation we 
use in these studies also allows us to test whether people have greater reputational concern 
when interacting with ingroup (vs. outgroup) members, and whether this explains why gossip 
enhances cooperation (H1b vs H2b).  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design. Across all studies, an a-priori power analysis (G*Power; 
Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) revealed a required sample size of 620 to achieve a 
statistical power (1-β) of .80 to detect an effect size of d = 0.32 retrieved from a recent meta-
analysis on ingroup favoritism (Balliet et al., 2014).2 One participant responded the same to 
most questions (e.g., estimating 1 dot in all the dot estimation tasks) and was excluded from 
the analyses. Participants (N = 619, 253 women; Mage = 32.15 years, SD = 10.31) recruited 
UNBOUNDED INDIRECT RECIPROCITY  9 
 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) completed the study for US$0.50. The study was a 
2 (social identification: high, low) × 2 (reputation: public, anonymous) × 3 (partner’s group 
membership: ingroup, outgroup, stranger) mixed design. Partner’s group membership was a 
within-participant, counter-balanced, manipulation.  
Procedure. Participants provided their informed consent and were told to be 
simultaneously playing online with several other participants. They were led to believe they 
were interacting with real partners. The experiment was divided into two parts. In the first 
part, we categorized participants into different groups through a dot estimation task (Tajfel et 
al., 1971), and then randomly assigned them into either high or low identification condition 
through a filler questionnaire. In the second part, participants were provided instructions 
about the dictator game and answered four comprehension questions before making their 
decisions. They were randomly assigned to either a public or an anonymous condition in the 
dictator game. Finally, we measured their social identification and reputational concern. 
Minimal group paradigm and social identification. Partner’s group membership was 
manipulated using the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). We based our methods 
on previous online experiments that have successfully used this paradigm to study ingroup 
favoritism (e.g., Cikara et al., 2014; Summerville & Chartier, 2013). In a perception task, 
participants estimated the number of dots presented in eight pictures (Leonardelli & Brewer, 
2001), and then received a bogus feedback that they belonged to the group of overestimators. 
Group membership of the other participants was also manipulated by bogus feedback. 
Next, participants completed a personal characteristics questionnaire. They first 
learned that overestimators share some lifestyle characteristics and that this questionnaire was 
designed to understand the proportion of these shared habits. The procedure was adapted 
from prior research on SIT (Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Stroebe, Lodewijkx, & Spears, 
2005). To manipulate social identification, participants received different feedback after 
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completing the questionnaire: They share 95% (high-identification) or 45% (low-
identification) of lifestyle characteristics with overestimators.  
Dictator game. Participants interacted with another fictitious participant and received 
an endowment of 100 lottery tickets. They could freely distribute any of these tickets to their 
interaction partner (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). They played three one-shot 
dictator games with different partners (counter-balanced): an ingroup member 
(overestimator), an outgroup member (underestimator), and an unclassified participant. 
Participants were told that they would interact with a new partner on each trial, and did not 
know the total number of decision-making tasks. The number of lottery tickets they gave to 
their partner in this dictator game was the measure of cooperation.  
Reputation. Participants learned that their choice was revealed to other participants 
with whom they would interact in a future decision making task (public) or that their choice 
was anonymous (Van Vugt & Hardy, 2009). They were informed about the public or 
anonymity condition in the instructions and reminded in each of their decision tasks.  
Social identification and reputational concern. For manipulation checks, we 
measured participants’ social identification (six items, α = .75; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001) 
and reputational concern (four items, α = .81; adapted from Wu et al., 2015) after the dictator 
game. Both the social identification (e.g., “I feel that this group is an important reflection of 
who I am”) and reputational concern (e.g., “it is important that others will accept me”) scales 
were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree). 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. Participants in the high-identification condition (M = 2.33, SD 
= 0.69) reported greater identification with their group than those in the low-identification 
condition (M = 2.03, SD = 0.66), t(618) = 5.55, p < .001, d = 0.45. Moreover, participants in 
the public condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.21) reported greater reputational concern than those in 
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the anonymous condition (M = 2.84, SD = 1.19), t(618) = 3.74, p < .001, d = 0.30. Thus, the 
manipulations of social identification and reputation were successful. 
Cooperation. We conducted a 2 (social identification) × 2 (reputation) × 3 (partner’s 
group membership) mixed ANOVA predicting cooperation. Participants were slightly more 
cooperative with ingroup members (M = 31.78, SD = 23.07), than with outgroup members (M 
= 31.04, SD = 22.78), or strangers (M = 31.10, SD = 22.68), but the difference did not meet 
traditional standards of statistical significance, F(2, 615) = 2.62, p = .07, ηp2 = .009. We 
created two hypothesis-relevant orthogonal contrasts of partner’s group membership: 
Contrast 1 (ingroup vs outgroup and stranger contrast) and Contrast 2 (outgroup vs stranger 
contrast). 3 Planned comparisons revealed a significant Contrast 1, F(1, 615) = 5.29, p = .02, 
ηp2 =.009, indicating more cooperation toward an ingroup member, compared to an outgroup 
member and a stranger. Contrast 2 was not significant, suggesting no significant difference in 
cooperation with outgroup members and strangers, F(1, 615) = 0.008, p = .93. BGR predicts 
that ingroup favoritism in cooperation would only occur in the public condition, but not in the 
private condition (H1a). Testing this interaction hypothesis using Contrast 1 revealed that 
Contrast 1 did not significantly interact with public/anonymous decisions in predicting 
cooperation, F(1, 615) = 0.325, p = .57. 
Supporting an unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective, participants were more 
cooperative in the public condition (M = 34.57, SD = 22.76) than in the anonymous condition 
(M = 28.00, SD = 22.54), F(1, 615) = 13.88, p < .001, d = 0.30. Social identification did not 
affect cooperation, F(1, 615) = 0.57, p = .45. Additionally, social identification and partner’s 
group membership did not interact to predict cooperation, F(2, 615) = 0.02, p = .49. The 
three-way interaction between social identification, reputation, and partner’s group 
membership was also not significant, F(2, 615) = 1.25, p = .29.  
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Mediation analysis. We tested whether the public versus anonymous decisions 
influenced cooperation through the mediation of reputational concern using the bootstrapping 
method for mediation (5,000 bootstrap samples, model 4, Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The 
results showed that reputational concern had a significant indirect effect, b = 1.24, 95% CI 
[0.56, 2.26]. Moreover, the relation was partially mediated because the total effect of 
public/anonymous decisions (total effect = 6.56, p < .001) on cooperation was still significant 
when the mediator was included in the model (direct effect = 5.32, p = .002). 
In sum, people cooperated more when their reputation was at stake, regardless of their 
partner’s group membership or their own level of social identification. Moreover, 
reputational concern mediated the effect of public versus anonymous decisions on 
cooperation across interactions with ingroup members, outgroup members, and unclassified 
strangers. The experimental design does not permit a test of the BGR hypothesis that this 
mediation model would be restricted to interactions with ingroup members (H1b), and we test 
this hypothesis in Studies 3 to 5. These initial findings provide support for the unbounded 
indirect reciprocity perspective, and fail to support predictions from either BGR or SIT.  
Study 2 
Study 2 replicates Study 1 using an interdependent decision making task in which 
each person’s outcome depends on their partner’s actions. Previous research has found that 
higher degree of outcome interdependence tends to increase ingroup favoritism in 
cooperation (Balliet et al., 2014).  The dictator game used in Study 1 does not contain mutual 
interdependence, and so in Study 2 we observed ingroup favoritism in cooperation in an 
outcome-interdependent situation (i.e., a one-shot public goods game).4  
Method 
Participants and design. After excluding 13 participants who had participated in the 
previous study, 607 participants (297 women; Mage = 33.64 years, SD = 11.57) recruited from 
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MTurk completed the study for US$0.50. The study involved a 2 (social identification: high, 
low) × 2 (reputation: public, anonymous) × 3 (partner’s group membership: ingroup, 
outgroup, stranger) mixed design. Partner’s group membership was a within-participant, 
counter-balanced, manipulation. 
Procedure. The procedure, as well as the measures of social identification (α = .75) 
and reputational concern (α = .73), was the same as Study 1. 
Public goods game. Participants learned that they would interact with five 
participants simultaneously online. They had to contribute any amount out of 100 lottery 
tickets to a common pool (Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2013). The total contribution was 
then multiplied by 1.5 and divided equally among all members, regardless of individual 
contributions. Participants completed three rounds of the public goods game, each with a 
different group: five ingroup members, five outgroup members, and five undefined strangers. 
Cooperation was measured as the number of lottery tickets invested in the common pool. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. Participants in the high-identification condition (M = 2.31, SD 
= 0.84) reported significantly greater identification with their group than those in the low-
identification condition (M = 2.13, SD = 0.76), t(605) = 2.72, p = .007, d = 0.14. Moreover, 
participants reported greater reputational concern in the public condition (M = 2.58, SD = 
0.95) than in the anonymous condition (M = 2.38, SD = 0.83), t(605) = 3.12, p < .001, d = 
0.22. Thus, the manipulations of social identification and reputation were successful. 
Cooperation. We conducted a 2 (social identification) × 2 (reputation) × 3 (partner’s 
group membership) mixed ANOVA predicting cooperation. Participants cooperated more 
with ingroup members (M = 49.92, SD = 32.43), compared to outgroup members (M = 46.18, 
SD = 31.16) and strangers (M = 47.87, SD = 31.68), F(2, 603) = 13.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. 
Similar to Study 1, we created two orthogonal contrasts of partner’s group membership (i.e., 
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Contrast 1 and Contrast 2). Planned comparisons revealed significant Contrast 1, F(1, 603) = 
19.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .03, and Contrast 2, F(1, 603) = 6.04, p = .013, ηp2 = .01, indicating 
more cooperation with ingroup members, compared to outgroup members and strangers, and 
also more cooperation with strangers than with outgroup members. Failing to support BGR 
(H1a), Contrast 1 did not significantly interact with public/anonymous decisions in predicting 
cooperation, F(1, 615) = 0.22, p = .64. 
In support of an unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective (H2a), participants 
cooperated more in the public condition (M = 50.93, SD = 31.20) than in the anonymous 
condition (M = 45.05, SD = 32.31), F(1, 603) = 5.80, p = .02, d = 0.20. Social identification 
did not affect cooperation, F(1, 603) = 1.33,  p = .25. Failing to support SIT (H3), social 
identification did not interact with partner’s group membership predicting cooperation, F(2, 
603) = 0.26, p = .77. The three-way interaction on cooperation was also not significant, F(2, 
603) = 0.32, p = .72. 
Mediation analysis. We tested whether public versus anonymous decisions 
influenced cooperation through the mediation of reputational concern using the bootstrapping 
method for mediation (5,000 bootstrap samples, model 4, Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Reputational concern had a significant indirect effect, b = 0.60, 95% CI [0.09, 1.60]. The 
relation was partially mediated since the total effect of public/anonymous decisions (total 
effect = 5.76, p = .02) on cooperation remained significant when the mediator was included 
in the model (direct effect = 5.16, p = .04). 
Thus, Study 2 replicates the results of Study 1. People were more cooperative when 
their reputation was at stake, regardless of their partner’s group membership (i.e., unbounded 
indirect reciprocity hypothesis, H2a). Additionally, reputational concern mediated the effect 
of public versus anonymous decisions on cooperation across interactions with ingroup 
members, outgroup members, and unclassified strangers (H2b). Study 2 did not support the 
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BGR prediction that reputation would interact with partner’s group membership to predict 
cooperation (H1a). Again, we did not find support for the SIT prediction that social 
identification would interact with group membership to promote cooperation (H3). 
Study 3 
In Study 3, we further compare BGR and the unbounded indirect reciprocity 
perspective by manipulating gossip (i.e., reputation transmission) during a cooperation task. 
Previous research has found that people are more cooperative with others who can gossip to 
their future interaction partners (Wu et al., 2015, 2016). Here, we investigate whether people 
are more cooperative with someone who can gossip to their future partners, regardless of 
these future partners’ group membership. Additionally, in the remaining studies we utilize a 
between-participant manipulation of future partner’s group membership. This method allows 
for testing whether the effect of gossip on cooperation is mediated by reputational concern, 
and whether this mediation effect varies when the gossip recipient is an ingroup or outgroup 
member (i.e., a moderated mediation model, see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The moderated mediation model tested in Studies 3-5. 
 
Gossip 
Reputational 
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Method 
Participants and design. After excluding seven participants who had participated in 
previous studies, 613 participants (310 women; Mage = 33.88 years, SD = 11.69) recruited 
from MTurk completed the study for US$0.50. The study was a 2 (future partner’s group 
membership: ingroup, outgroup) × 2 (gossip: to a future partner, to an unrelated person) 
between-participants design. 
Procedure. Study 3 had a similar structure with previous studies. Participants were 
first categorized as overestimators through the dot-estimation task and led to believe they 
were interacting with real participants. Then, they engaged in two decision making tasks—a 
dictator game (Task 1) and a trust game (Task 2). They first read the instructions, answered 
six comprehension questions, and then started making decisions. Participants’ reputational 
concern was measured right after the trust game. Based on their decisions, they earned lottery 
tickets to win a 2-dollar bonus (1 ticket = 0.01% chance of winning). 
Dictator game and gossip. Participants interacted with another fictitious participant 
who was an ingroup member. They received an initial endowment of 100 lottery tickets, and 
could freely distribute any amount of tickets to their partner, who had no initial endowment 
(Forsythe et al., 1994). To manipulate gossip, participants were told that their partner could 
send a message to either (a) their future interaction partner (i.e., an ingroup or outgroup 
member) in Task 2 or (b) a person with whom they would not interact in Task 2 (i.e., an 
unrelated person). The number of lottery tickets they gave to their partner was the measure of 
cooperation. 
Trust game. Participants then interacted with a different person (i.e., ingroup or 
outgroup member) in the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In this game, 
participants acted as the investor, and their partner was the responder. The investor first 
decided to send any amount (range: 0 to 100) of an initial endowment of 100 lottery tickets to 
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the responder. While the amount sent to the responder was tripled, any amount kept for 
oneself remained the same. Then, the responder had to return back some of the tripled 
amount to the investor. Participants learned that they would receive feedback about their own 
and others’ decisions at the end of the experiment. 
Reputational concern. Similar with Studies 1 and 2, we measured participants’ 
reputational concern on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree), using 
an extended six-item scale that includes two gossip-related items after the trust game 
(“During the decision making task, I did not expect others to talk about me behind my back”; 
“I did not consider what others would say about me during the decision making task”) (α = 
.63; adapted from Wu et al., 2015). 
Results and Discussion 
Cooperation. A 2 (future partner’s group membership) × 2 (gossip) ANOVA 
revealed support for Hypothesis 2a: People were more cooperative toward a partner who 
could gossip to their future partner (M = 38.52, SD = 24.77) than a partner who could gossip 
to an unrelated person (M = 31.69, SD = 25.68), F(1, 609) = 11.34, p = .001, d = 0.28. Future 
partner’s group membership, F(1, 609) = 0.23, p = .63, and its interaction with gossip 
predicting cooperation, F(1, 609) = 1.01, p = .32, were not statistically significant.  
Mediation analysis. Next, we tested whether gossip influenced cooperation through 
reputational concern, and whether future partner’s group membership moderated this 
mediation. To do so, we applied a bootstrapping method for testing multiple moderated 
mediation (5,000 bootstrap samples, model 7, Preacher & Hayes, 2008, see Figure 1).5 The 
indirect effect of gossip on cooperation was consistently significant through reputational 
concern when one’s future interaction partner was an ingroup member, b = 1.73, 95% CI 
[0.61, 3.36], or an outgroup member, b = 3.74, 95% CI [2.10, 5.95]. The total effect of gossip 
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on cooperation (total effect = 6.83, p < .001) became nonsignificant when the mediator was 
included in the model (direct effect = 3.81, p = .06). 
Thus, we find support for an unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective (H2a)—
people were more cooperative in response to gossip to a future partner, regardless of this 
future partner’s group membership. As additional support for this perspective (H2b), 
reputational concern mediated the relation between gossip and cooperation regardless of 
whether one’s future interaction partner was an ingroup or outgroup member. We failed to 
support the BGR hypotheses that gossip and reputational concern would only affect 
cooperation with ingroup members (H1a, H1b). Therefore, Study 3 replicates and extends the 
conclusions of the previous studies. 
Study 4 
In Study 3, participants interacted with an ingroup member in Task 1 (dictator game) 
who could or could not gossip to an ingroup or outgroup member in Task 2 (trust game). In 
Study 4, we replicate the procedure of Study 3, with three modifications. First, we 
simultaneously manipulate the group membership of the participant’s partner in Task 1 and 2. 
This captures many real-life situations in which people interact with outgroup or ingroup 
members, who can gossip to other outgroup or ingroup members, respectively. Second, 
people can often gossip to many others and so we increased the number of gossip recipients. 
Third, to simplify the experimental design for participants, we used the same paradigm for 
Task 1 and Task 2, i.e., the prisoner’s dilemma.      
Method 
Participants and design. Participants (N = 360; 172 women; Mage = 34.96 
years, SD = 10.53) recruited from MTurk completed the study for $1.50. The study was a 2 
(partner’s group membership: ingroup vs outgroup) × 2 (gossip vs no gossip) between-
participants design. The sample size was determined after a-priori power analysis requiring a 
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sample size of 360 to achieve a statistical power (1-β) of .80 and to detect an effect size of d 
= 0.42. The effect size was obtained from a recent meta-analysis on ingroup favoritism in 
cooperation in social dilemmas, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Balliet et al., 2014). 
Procedure. Study 4 has a similar structure with previous studies. Participants were 
first categorized as overestimators through the dot-estimation task. Then, the manipulation of 
gossip was introduced. Participants could interact with either a partner who could gossip to 
other 8 participants or a partner who could not gossip. After answering six comprehension 
questions, they interacted in two prisoner’s dilemmas, each with a different partner. After the 
prisoner’s dilemmas, participants responded to items that measured reputational concern (α = 
.77) and social identification (α = .90) used in the previous studies. 
Prisoner’s dilemma and gossip. Participants interacted in two prisoner’s dilemma 
(PD) tasks (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). In each PD task, they were endowed 100 tickets 
and had to decide how many tickets to give to their partner. Each ticket that the participant 
and the partner gave to the other was doubled. Participants interacted with a different partner 
in each PD. However, their partners’ group membership was manipulated as a between-
participants factor. In Task 1, participants interacted with an individual categorized as either 
an ingroup or outgroup member. Importantly, partner’s group membership was the same 
across Task 1 and 2.  
In the gossip condition, participants were told that their partner could send a message 
to eight ingroup or outgroup members, and participants would then interact with one of these 
people in Task 2. In the no gossip condition, the ingroup or outgroup member could not 
communicate with the others online, so participants would then interact with either an 
ingroup or outgroup member who did not receive any message from their partner in Task 1. 
Participants earned lottery tickets during the experiment based on their decisions. Each ticket 
represented a 0.01% chance to win a 2-dollar bonus. 
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Results and Discussion 
Cooperation. In support of Hypothesis 2a, people cooperated more with partners who 
could gossip to their future interaction partners (M = 43.61, SD = 31.67), compared to 
partners who could not gossip (M = 32.11, SD = 30.66), F(1, 362) = 12.20,  p = .001, d = 
0.38. There was no main effect of partner’s group membership on cooperation, F(1, 362) = 
0.48, p = .48. Failing to support Hypothesis 1a, there was no significant interaction between 
partner’s group membership and gossip on cooperation, F(1, 362) = 0.02, p = .89.  
Mediation analysis. We tested whether gossip influenced cooperation through the 
mediation of reputational concern conditionally for ingroup and outgroup members using the 
bootstrapping method for multiple moderated mediation (5,000 bootstrap samples, model 7, 
Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Reputational concern had a significant indirect effect when 
interacting with ingroup members, b = 2.16, 95% CI [0.17, 5.05], or outgroup members, b = 
2.34, 95% CI [0.25, 5.54]. The relation was partially mediated since the total effect of gossip 
(total effect = 11.49, p < .001) on cooperation remained significant when the mediator was 
included in the model (direct effect = 9.24, p = .008). 
Thus, Study 4 continued to find support for an unbounded indirect reciprocity 
perspective (H2a, H2b)—people were more cooperative in response to gossip to a future 
partner regardless of this future partner’s group membership, and reputational concern 
mediated this effect. Again, we failed to support the BGR hypotheses that gossip and 
reputational concern would only affect cooperation with ingroup members (H1a, H1b).  
Study 5 
 Across all previous studies, we analyzed whether cues of indirect benefits increased 
cooperation with ingroup and outgroup members using a minimal group paradigm. While the 
use of minimal groups provides strong internal validity to our studies, a limitation is that the 
findings may not generalize to natural groups. To address this issue, Study 5 extends our 
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paradigm to interactions between members of two political coalitions in the U.S.: 
Republicans and Democrats. Previous research has found that both Republicans and 
Democrats display ingroup favoritism in cooperation (Balliet, Tybur, Wu, Antonellis, & Van 
Lange, 2016). We conducted the study on the following day after the Inaugural Presidential 
Address of Donald Trump (January 21, 2017). This event marked the completion of a bitter 
competition between these coalitions.  
Method 
Participants and design. After excluding five participants who had participated in 
previous studies, 615 participants (351 women; Mage = 38.12 years, SD = 12.43) recruited 
from MTurk completed the study for $1.20. The study was a 2 (partner’s group membership: 
ingroup vs outgroup) × 2 (gossip vs no gossip) between-participants design.  
Procedure. Study 5 had a similar structure with Studies 3 and 4 except for the use of 
natural groups. Participants were asked which political party they most identified with 
(Republicans or Democrats).6 Then they read instructions about the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
task and learned that they would interact with different people in several PD tasks. Similar to 
the previous studies, participants interacted twice. They were randomly assigned to interact 
with partners who were always Republican or Democrat. Participants were also randomly 
assigned to conditions in which their partner in Task 1 could or could not gossip to their 
partner in Task 2. Same as Study 4, their partner in Task 1 and Task 2 always shared the 
same group membership. After reading instructions of the PD, participants responded to six 
comprehension questions, and made decisions in two prisoner’s dilemmas. At the end of the 
prisoner’s dilemmas, they completed the measures of reputational concern (α = .76) and 
social identification (α = .88).  
 
Results and Discussion 
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Cooperation. In support of Hypothesis 2a, people were more cooperative with 
partners who could gossip to their future interaction partners (M = 45.35, SD = 29.43), 
compared to partners who could not gossip (M = 40.74, SD = 29.21), F(1, 611) = 4.10, p = 
.04, d = 0.16. People also cooperated more with ingroup members (M = 45.84, SD = 29.43), 
compared to outgroup members (M = 40.12, SD = 29.21), F(1, 611) = 6.01, p = .01, d = 0.20. 
Failing to support H1a, there was no interaction between partner’s group membership and 
gossip predicting cooperation, F(1, 611) = 0.22, p = .64. 
Mediation analysis. We tested whether gossip influenced cooperation through the 
mediation of reputational concern conditionally for ingroup and outgroup members using the 
bootstrapping method for multiple moderated mediation (5,000 bootstrap samples, model 7, 
Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Reputational concern did not have a significant indirect effect 
when interacting with ingroup members, b = -0.15, 95% CI [-1.14, 0.48], or outgroup 
members, b = -0.28, 95% CI [-1.70, 0.95]. 
Therefore, in a study using natural groups, we continued to find some support for an 
unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective (H2a)—people were more cooperative in response 
to gossip to a future partner, regardless of this future partner’s group membership. However, 
Study 5 did not replicate the findings from the previous four studies that supported the 
hypothesis (H2b) that reputational concern mediates the relation between gossip and 
cooperation regardless of one’s future partner’s group membership. Study 5 also did not 
support the BGR hypotheses that gossip and reputational concern would only affect 
cooperation with ingroup members (H1a, H1b). 
General Discussion 
Do people care about their reputation, and behave in ways to manage their reputation, 
when interacting with outgroup members? Answers to this question carry both theoretical and 
practical implications. From a theoretical point of view, people should be cooperative in 
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situations when their behavior can affect their reputation and lead to potential indirect 
benefits (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). However, some theory has suggested that indirect 
benefits are limited to social exchange with ingroup members. Specifically, BGR predicts 
that reputation promotes cooperation among ingroup, but not outgroup, members (Yamagishi 
& Kiyonari, 2000). Yet, the indirect benefits of social interactions may transcend group 
boundaries and so reputational concern may promote cooperation with both ingroup and 
outgroup members (Milinski et al., 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Wu et al., 2015, 
2016). From this unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective, people should increase 
cooperation in response to cues that their behavior can carry reputational consequences, 
regardless of whether they are interacting with ingroup or outgroup members. The primary 
objective of this work was to test these competing predictions from BGR and this unbounded 
indirect reciprocity perspective.  
Across five studies, we manipulated (a) cues that cooperation could have reputational 
consequences (or not) and (b) if people were interacting with an ingroup or outgroup member 
in a cooperative decision making task. Across our studies, we operationalized reputation and 
group membership differently. Studies 1 and 2 manipulated reputational consequences by 
making participants’ choice public or anonymous to their future partner. Studies 3 to 5 
manipulated reputational consequences through gossip, such that participants’ current 
interaction partner could gossip to their future partner who was an ingroup or outgroup 
member. Studies 1 to 4 used a minimal group paradigm to create groups, while Study 5 used 
natural groups—two competing political coalitions in the United States (Republicans and 
Democrats). Moreover, our studies employed several different measures of cooperation 
(dictator game, prisoner’s dilemma, and public goods dilemma). One resounding message is 
clear from our findings: people always cooperated more when their reputation was at stake, 
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even when their reputation was transmitted to a future interaction partner who was an 
outgroup member.   
These studies provide evidence in support of an unbounded indirect reciprocity 
perspective. According to this approach, people condition their cooperation on cues that an 
interaction may result in future indirect benefits (see Wu et al., 2016). This ability can rely on 
several cues of indirect benefits, such as observability, monitoring, and others’ social network 
connections (e.g., the potential to gossip). Such cues may lead to an explicit concern for the 
collective beliefs about oneself (i.e., reputational concern), which motivates cooperation. This 
approach predicts that cues of reputation will affect cooperation, independent of any effect of 
group membership. Indeed, a random effects meta-analysis also found support for a main 
effect of reputation on cooperation independent of group membership across all studies (k = 
5, N = 2,814, d = 0.26, 95% CI [0.17, 0.35]). Studies 1 and 2 found that reputational concern 
positively relates to cooperation across interactions with ingroup members, outgroup 
members, and unclassified strangers. In these studies, partner’s group membership was a 
within-participant manipulation, and so we could not test how reputational concern was 
affected by interacting with either an ingroup or outgroup member. Studies 3 to 5 used a 
between-participants manipulation of group membership and subsequently measured 
reputational concern after the interaction with an ingroup or outgroup member. Studies 3 and 
4 found that the positive effect of cues of gossip on cooperation was mediated by reputational 
concern when interacting with ingroup and outgroup members. Although we did not replicate 
this finding in Study 5, a random effects meta-analysis across all five studies (k = 5, N = 
2,814) clearly suggests that cues of gossip enhance reputational concern independent of 
partner group membership, d = 0.42, 95% CI [0.27, 0.58]. Thus, across our studies, we find 
that people care about their reputation, and behave in ways to promote a positive reputation, 
even when reputation is being transmitted to future interaction partners who are outgroup 
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members. Indeed, reputation matters across group boundaries and indirect reciprocity is 
unbounded by group membership. 
These studies do not support BGR’s hypothesis that people would cooperate more 
with ingroup members than outgroup members only when their reputation was at stake. 
Across five studies that employed different manipulations of group membership (minimal 
and natural groups), multiple cues of reputation (anonymity and gossip), and several 
measures of cooperation (dictator game, prisoner’s dilemma, and public goods game), we 
found that cues of reputation continued to affect cooperation independent of partner’s group 
membership. Moreover, these studies were sufficiently powered to detect a small effect of 
group membership at each level of the reputation manipulation. Applying a Bayesian 
approach to analyze support for the null hypothesis about the interaction between group 
membership and reputation on cooperation, we can infer moderate to strong levels of support 
for the null hypothesis.7 Taken together, these studies do not support the hypothesis that 
reputation is group bounded or that people only cooperate to promote their reputation among 
ingroup members. 
The results of this research and the unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective may be 
used to explain previous findings that outcome interdependence could increase cooperative 
behavior with outgroup members (Stroebe et al., 2005). Indeed, future interdependence with 
outgroup members can be a cue of possible indirect benefits of current behavior. Moreover, 
the present findings extend previous research that found that direct reciprocity opportunities 
can promote cooperation with outgroup members (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). Here we 
show that even indirect benefits can promote cooperation with outgroup members. This is 
important, because direct and indirect benefits do not always shape behavior in the same way 
or via the same psychological mechanisms. Indirect reciprocity raises unique adaptive 
problems, such as the promotion and maintenance of large-scale cooperation in social 
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networks, and may require specialized cognitive and motivational abilities to address these 
problems. For example, Wu et al. (2016) found that, contrary to direct reciprocity 
opportunities, people do not condition their behavior on explicit expectations of indirect 
benefits. Thus, there may be different psychological mechanisms operating to promote direct 
and indirect reciprocity, and future research should further examine how these different 
mechanisms can promote cooperation with outgroup members. 
Across several of our studies we continued to observe that people were more 
cooperative with ingroup than outgroup members. Previous theoretical accounts of this 
phenomenon have been social identity theory and bounded generalized reciprocity (see 
Balliet et al., 2014). In Studies 1 and 2, we manipulated participants’ level of social 
identification with their group. Despite the fact that this manipulation successfully varied 
levels of social identification, people did not display greater ingroup favoritism when they 
had high (vs. low) identification with their group. These results are consistent with recent 
research that did not support SIT relative to reputation-based accounts of ingroup favoritism 
in cooperation (Balliet et al., 2014; Yamagishi et al., 1999; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2016). That 
said, we also did not find support for the BGR hypothesis that ingroup favoritism can be 
explained by reputation-based cooperation.  
Considering the evidence presented here, it seems as though any cognitive and 
motivational processes operating to detect and respond to situations that present possible 
indirect benefits are different from psychological mechanisms regulating social exchange 
between groups. Evolutionary theories of coalitional psychology and cooperation posit 
functionally specialized mechanisms that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2005). Theory suggests that humans may possess specialized 
psychological mechanisms that enable people to learn from groups in a local environment 
and that this is associated with different outputs, such as cooperation, aggression, and 
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conformity (Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Kurzban, Tooby & Cosmides, 2001). It may be that a 
functionally specialized coalitional psychology is operating independent of any ability to 
infer when to condition behavior to acquire indirect benefits or that these mechanisms can 
operate when reputational cues are absent. Thus, ingroup favoritism in cooperation may serve 
a different function, or if it serves the function to acquire indirect benefits, it might operate 
through a different set of psychological mechanisms, such as a coalitional safety index 
(Boyer, Firat, & van Leeuwen, 2015), or an ability to capture multiple network externalities 
in clusters (Levine & Kurzban, 2006). Future research could benefit from a closer scrutiny of 
the different possible functions underlying intergroup discrimination in cooperation and the 
proximate mechanisms operating to make it happen.  
Reputation-based cooperation may provide some insight into reducing intergroup 
conflict, discrimination, and promoting intergroup harmony. Our results suggest that 
reputation-based cooperation can be a solution to promoting cooperation with ingroup and 
outgroup members. Applying reputation mechanisms (e.g., public monitoring, evaluation, 
and information sharing) can be efficient solutions to promote cooperation across group 
boundaries (Feinberg, Cheng, & Willer, 2012), but only when people understand their future 
interdependence with both ingroup and outgroup members. Such a solution to reducing 
discrimination can be strengthened by future research that examines additional cues that 
inform when behavior can lead to indirect benefits. For example, cues of social network 
properties that describe a current interaction partner’s position in a social network, such as 
centrality and density, may impact when people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation 
(Apicella et al., 2012; Curry & Dunbar, 2011; Gallo & Yan, 2015). Indeed, such cues may 
promote cooperation both within and between groups.  
To conclude, our studies clearly demonstrate that people respond to cues of reputation 
with an increase in cooperation, regardless of whether they are interacting with an ingroup or 
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outgroup member. Such findings address competing theoretical perspectives that indirect 
benefits are restricted to ingroup members or also extend to interactions with outgroup 
members. Future research needs to shed light on the complex mechanisms underlying why 
people tend to discriminate in favor of their ingroup members, even when reputational cues 
are not at stake. One existing theory stresses the role of social identity and self-esteem, but 
we did not find evidence in support of that theory. Attempts to provide an ultimate 
explanation of ingroup favoritism may be useful in generating hypotheses about the 
proximate psychological processes underlying this phenomenon.   
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Footnotes 
1 Here, we retain the original term “generalized reciprocity”, which proposes that 
people expect to receive benefits from other in-group members, especially if they have a 
positive reputation (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). Thus, generalized reciprocity in the 
context of BGR is the same as reputation-based “indirect reciprocity”.  
2 The a-priori power estimates refer to the main effect of group membership at each 
level of the reputation manipulation. The a-priori power analysis for the interaction estimated 
a lower sample size (476 participants for a 2 × 3 design and 500 for a 2 × 2 design). 
3 Contrast 1 can test for a motivation to benefit ingroup members (ingroup > outgroup 
& stranger), while Contrast 2 tests for a motivation to derogate outgroup members (outgroup 
< stranger) (see Balliet et al., 2014).  
4 In Studies 1 and 2, we also measured perceived entitativity for exploratory purposes. 
In Studies 4 and 5, we also included a measure of partner’s expected cooperation.  
5 We also tested whether gossip influenced cooperation through the mediation of 
reputational concern without considering the moderation of group membership (5,000 
bootstrap samples, model 4; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The indirect effect of gossip on 
cooperation was significant through reputational concern, b = 3.01, 95% CI [1.77, 4.62].  
6 We also included three items that measured political ideology: (a) left vs. right 
(Balliet et al., 2016), (b) an item that asked people who they voted for in the last presidential 
election, and (c) one item about which political party they identified with (Republican, 
Democrat, or other), along with a measure of outgroup hate (Duckitt, 2006).  
7 We used the Bayes Factor (BF) to quantify the evidence in support of the null 
hypothesis (Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015). Results from these analyses show moderate to 
very strong support for the null hypothesis (BFstudy1 = 0.02, BFstudy2 = 0.03, BFstudy3 = 0.15, 
BFstudy4 = 0.11, BFstudy5 = 0.10) (Jeffreys, 1961).  
